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out of the meeting, although their papers made it. These papers
move in the direction set by Sally Haslanger’s powerful essay
on “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by
Reason (Alone),” moving beyond where we are stuck to deeper
understanding of how and why (Haslanger 2008).
Peggy DesAutels (current Chair of the Committee on the
Status of Women) is right to remind us that, beyond some
rough head-counting, we are not in a position yet to answer
many questions about trends, and much less about professional
climate. Our professional association, the APA, has been late to
begin collecting basic data on underrepresented groups in the
academic profession of philosophy, although that work is (only)
now starting. We are fortunate, however, to be able to learn even
now from other fields where investigation of discrimination,
bias, and climate issues is farther advanced. DesAutels is able
to report to us from research in the STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Math) fields, that certain trends—overt
discrimination and subtle bias—are likely relevant to philosophy
due to the failure of women to reach “critical mass” of at least
25% in the field. No one who has worked in our profession or
attended our APA conferences will fail to see the potential of
these findings for professional philosophy. It is the likelihood
that STEM findings will bear on philosophy that situates the
anecdotal evidence that continues to pile up. Linda Alcoff, whose
moving and disturbing book Singing in the Fire: Stories of Women
in Philosophy (Alcoff 2003) collected harrowing tales from
successful women in the profession (raising the question of what
might have happened to less successful ones), acknowledges
that the past decades have seen significant and positive changes
in the situation and prospects of women in philosophy. Yet
current reports, including ones now collecting in the recently
emergent philosophical blogosphere, reveal that stunning and
overt forms of sexism, including physical aggression, are not,
it seems, uncommon. Michelle Saint, a recently minted Ph.D.,
digs into the new virtual world surrounding our profession, with
decidedly mixed results. I repeat: anecdotal evidence remains
important against the backdrop of what has been established
in other professional academic areas through careful research.
The anecdotal evidence should make us feel an urgent need
to have such careful research done for our own discipline and
profession; in the meanwhile, it brings to life vividly what it is like
to live in those worlds characterized by “overt discrimination and
subtle bias,” and worse, by sexual predation, harassment, and
demeaning insult.
Our contributors, however, do not leave us in despondency.
On the contrary, they bring forward not only fresh information, but
also reports of effective interventions, grass roots movements,
novel channels of information, and targeted trainings and
practices, that offer us things most of us can actually do and
insist upon, as well as learn and educate about, to start moving
our profession forward in more gender-just and gender-friendly
directions, as well as toward greater diversity, desperately
needed, of other kinds. DesAutels conducts workshops, based
in the body of research already available, aimed at advancing
women faculty and improving the gender climate in STEM
fields, targeting basic and changeable features of academic
practices and physical environments, and this could clearly be
done in philosophy. Alcoff is one architect of a forthcoming web
resource, “The Pluralist’s Guide to Philosophy,” that will provide,
at long last, fair and accurate information on opportunities for
graduate work in areas such as feminist philosophy, critical
race theory, GLBT philosophy, and continental philosophy that
are marginalized and misrepresented in the disproportionately
influential Leiter Report. Alcoff urges us to think politically
and institutionally about how to change obstacles that are
politically and institutionally maintained within our universities
and within our profession. Michelle Saint emphasizes the

novel potential of the professional philosophical blogosphere,
despite its own dangers and morale traps. She directs us (as
do DesAutels and Alcoff) to the unprecedented and revealing
blog, What Is It Like To Be A Woman in Philosophy? (http://
beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/), and its more
recent pendant blog, What We’re Doing About What It’s Like
(http://whatweredoingaboutwhatitslike.wordpress.com/). Saint
also alerts us to the aggressive public stand taken by several
male philosophers on ways to discredit known sexual harassers.
The hierarchical structures, formal and informal, of academic
institutions and departments have made it difficult for those
most vulnerable to abusive and disrespectful treatment to
speak up or find allies within or beyond their environments.
The virtual philosophical community might change that in
important ways, by recruiting new and wide communities of
concern and solidarity.
Finally, Rae Langton returns us to the question of what the
profession itself can accomplish institutionally. She provides
us with the brief overview of a report on women in philosophy
in universities in Australia, compiled with almost complete
participation of Philosophy Departments and sponsored by
the Australasian Association of Philosophy, the counterpart
to our APA. Here we get useful comparative data and
recommendations. Now all we need is something to compare
them to.
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Is the Climate any Warmer for Women in
Philosophy?
Peggy DesAutels

University of Dayton
Is the climate any warmer for women in philosophy?
Unfortunately, there is no way to answer this question with
much confidence. There are no systematic measures of even
the numbers of women in philosophy let alone systematic
measures of the overall climate. When we add in that the
climate for women varies significantly from department to
department and subfield to subfield, assessing the climate
for women in philosophy becomes even more difficult. I take
climate to include overt instances of sex discrimination and
sexual harassment as well as cumulative instances of subtle
bias against women. Both overt and subtle contributors to
climate are difficult to ferret out and summarize even for a
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single department let alone for such a wide-ranging group of
people as philosophers and the diverse departments these
philosophers inhabit.
The APA is significantly behind other professional
organizations in collecting data about and assessing the climate
for underrepresented groups. There are a number of efforts
underway to remedy this. As you may know, some philosophers
have formed themselves into the Women in Philosophy Task
Force. The group’s subcommittee on data (Sally Haslanger, Kate
Norlock, Linda Alcoff, Miriam Solomon, and I) recently sent a
letter to the APA Board of Officers that met at the beginning of
November 2010. The letter emphasizes the need for gathering
data on underrepresented groups in philosophy and urges the
Board to take specific immediate steps to obtain relevant data
about APA members and about hiring outcomes. The APA
Committee on the Status of Women and the Inclusiveness
Committee were co-signatories of the letter. A special thanks
goes to Miriam Solomon for her relentless efforts in drafting this
letter and moving it forward. As a result of these efforts, the APA
agreed to gather data on APA members and from departments
advertising in JFP. Nonetheless, there has been difficulty bringing
new software online, so it remains unclear how much can be
done anytime soon. The APA board is supposed to provide a
report by the beginning of February updating the Inclusiveness
Committee and the Committee on the Status of Women on its
progress in collecting data, so stay tuned.
Meanwhile, more qualitative data on the climate
for women in philosophy is being collected, albeit nonsystematically, by a recent blog entitled “What is it Like to Be
a Woman in Philosophy” (http://beingawomaninphilosophy.
wordpress.com/) and the even more recent “What We’re
Doing About What Its Like: Making Things Better for Women
in Philosophy?” (http://whatweredoingaboutwhatitslike.
wordpress.com/). Female and even a few male philosophers
have sent in short accounts of their individual experiences, both
negative and positive, related to being a woman in philosophy.
The stories range from horrifying to quite encouraging. But
for the most part, readers write in that when strung together,
the stories leave them discouraged and depressed. At the
very least, philosophy appears to house a number of very bad
apples who harass and discriminate against women often
with impunity. But exactly how many overt harassers and
discriminators are at large within philosophy at this time is
impossible to determine. Meanwhile, if you haven’t yet visited
this blog, I encourage that you do so.
Although we know very little about the degrees and
extents of either overt or subtle discrimination against women
in philosophy today, the National Science Foundation has
funded a number of studies and initiatives tied to hiring and
advancing women faculty in Science, Engineering, Technology,
and Math (STEM). There are clearly a number of parallels
between issues tied to STEM women faculty and those tied
to philosophy women faculty. For example, studies show
that there are special climate-related issues for any minority
group that has failed to reach critical mass in a particular field.
Critical mass is reached when a group comprises at least
25% of a field. Right now, our best calculations estimate that
women faculty comprise approximately 23% of philosophy
faculty in the United States. For some subfields in philosophy
this percentage is lower. Although I have no data to back me
up, based on my own experiences at various conferences, my
guess is that the percentages of philosophers who are women
are even lower in such subfields as metaphysics, philosophy
of mind, and philosophy of language, and are higher in such
fields as feminist philosophy, applied ethics, and possibly even
philosophy of science.

When a minority group does not reach critical mass in a
field, studies show that it is far more likely that this group will
be subject to both overt discrimination and subtle bias that
in turn prevents members of that group from being hired or
advanced. Certainly, other factors contribute to a continuing
chilly climate for women in philosophy, but I think that much
insight can be gained by focusing on issues tied to the failure of
women faculty in philosophy to reach critical mass. It would be
interesting, for example, to compare the climates for women
in departments in which women have reached or surpassed
critical mass and those that fall far short of the mark. Although
such studies have not been done, I can report from personal
experience the climate warmth in my own department. My
department is quite large (fifteen or so tenure/tenure-track
positions) and is very women- and feminist- friendly. I maintain
that much of the warmth of our departmental climate is tied
to the fact that we have seven tenured and tenure-track
women in the department, two of whom are full professors.
Thus over forty percent of our philosophy faculty is women
and thirty-three percent of our department’s full professors is
women. It is approaching “normal” to be both a woman and
a philosopher at my particular university. Having a significant
number of women in a department means that overt instances
of discrimination against and harassment of women faculty
by other faculty members in the department are much more
likely to be challenged and reduced. When departments add
in training on implicit bias and implement best practices to
prevent it, even the more subtle forms of discrimination have
a better chance of being identified and reduced.
Unfortunately, the ratio of women to men philosophy
faculty found in my own department is anything but normal
nationwide. What I would like to do with the remainder of my
time is describe some of the findings of relevance to the climate
for women in philosophy tied to implicit bias and a lack of critical
mass. I have been building my knowledge on this topic over
the past several years, ever since I began serving as a principal
on a National Science Foundation ADVANCE grant. This grant
was awarded to four Dayton, Ohio regional degree-granting
institutions: University of Dayton, Wright State University,
Central State University, and Air Force Institute of Technology.
Like many other ADVANCE grants awarded throughout the
country, this is a five-year, multi-million dollar grant given out
by the National Science Foundation with the goal of increasing
the representation and advancement of women in academic
science and engineering careers, thereby contributing to the
development of a more diverse science and engineering
workforce. My job on this grant is to conduct workshops for
faculty and staff at all four institutions on best practices tied to
increasing the numbers of and advancing women faculty in
STEM fields. One of my emphases is on how best to recognize
and address implicit gender biases that contribute to barriers
against recruiting and advancing women STEM faculty. Although
NSF funds only projects tied to STEM women faculty, much of
the research and best practices coming out of these grants
are directly relevant to climate issues for women faculty in
philosophy. I should note here that there is at least one other
philosopher, Carla Fehr, a philosopher of science at Iowa State,
who has actively worked on an NSF ADVANCE project.
For a very nice summary of relevant research to date on
recruiting and advancing women STEM faculty, see Beyond
Bias and Barriers: Fufilling the Potential of Women in Academic
Science and Engineering (National Academy of Sciences,
2007), put out both online and in hardcover. For more general
gender-related psychological and neuroscientific research, see
Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism
Create Difference (Fine, 2010). And for specific work on gender
schemas and the role they play in the advancement of women
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in academia, Why So Slow?: The Advancement of Women
(Valian, 1998). For those unfamiliar with Virginia Valian’s work,
gender schemas (or implicit biases) involve non-conscious
expectations or stereotypes associated with members of a group
that guide perceptions and behaviors. Schemas influence the
judgments of both non-group members and group members
themselves. These biased judgments affect hiring and
advancement and result in an accumulation of disadvantage.
Schemas are widely culturally shared; both men and women
hold them about gender; both whites and people of color hold
them about race. Of special relevance to philosophy, schemas
are more likely to be invoked when groups (e.g. women) lack
critical mass. We no longer rely on group-based schemas when
there are many individuals, since we cannot differentiate among
these individuals by resorting to these schemas. On the other
hand, when there are very few women and minorities on a
faculty, schemas are much more likely to be invoked.
Some of the more striking studies showing the effects of
implicit bias on judgments include: (1) A study involving hiring
for orchestras. When auditioners were behind a screen, the
percentage of female new hires for orchestral jobs increased
25-46% (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). (2) A study involving hiring of
faculty for psychology departments. When evaluating identical
application packages, male and female university psychology
professors preferred 2:1 to hire “Brian” over “Karen” (Steinpreis,
Anders, and Ritzke, 1999). And (3) A study examining letters
of recommendation for successful medical school faculty
applicants. Letters for men were longer and contained more
references to the applicants’ CVs, publications, patients, and
colleagues. Letters for women were shorter and contained
more references to personal life as well as more “doubt raisers”
(e.g., hedges, faint praise, and irrelevancies). Comments in
letters for women included: “It’s amazing how much she’s
accomplished.” “It appears her health is stable.” “She is close
to my wife” (Trix and Psenka, 2003).
Other studies of relevance to the climate for women in
philosophy are tied to women’s reticence to participate in
fields where women are outnumbered by men. As Cordelia
Fine points out, there are a number of subtle ways that women
can be sent the message that they “don’t belong” in particular
fields. For instance, one study shows how changing the
physical environment from “geeky” to “less geeky” (e.g., from
a room containing Star Trek posters, geeky comics, technical
magazines, junk food, video game boxes, electronic equipment
to a room containing art posters, general interest magazines,
and water bottles) significantly increased women’s expressed
interest in technical jobs and internships (Fine, 45-46). I was
reminded by this study of my own graduate student days. All
four walls of the graduate student lounge were lined with blownup photos of past chairs of the department of philosophy—all
of them white males. In another study of special relevance
to philosophy meetings, advanced women undergraduates
were attached to equipment that recorded heart rate and skin
conductance and then shown advertising videos for a Math,
Science, and Engineering (MSE) conference.
There were two, near-identical videos, depicting about
150 people. However, in one video the ratio of men to
women approximated the actual gender ratio of MSE
degrees: there were three men to every woman. In
the second video, men and women were featured
in equal numbers. Women who saw the genderequal video responded very much like men, both
physiologically and in their sense of belonging and
interest in the conference. But for women who saw
the more realistically imbalanced version, it was a very
different experience. They became more aroused—an

indicator of physiological vigilance. They expressed
less interest in attending the conference when it was
gender unbalanced. …And although women and men
who saw the gender-balanced video very strongly
agreed that they belonged there, the conviction of
this agreement among women who saw a gender
imbalance was significantly lower. (Fine, 42)
How many times have I attended a philosophy conference that
consisted almost entirely of men? Although there were many
reasons why I decided to engage in feminist philosophy, one
of these reasons was simply so that I could attend feminist
conferences where for once the women outnumbered the
men—where for once I belonged.
Let’s go back to the question of whether the climate is
warming for women in philosophy. Not only are the chances
quite slim of the climate’s warming significantly as long as
woman faculty fail to reach critical mass, but the APA’s ability
adequately to assess past, present, and future climates for
women in philosophy is grossly inadequate. One of the first
expectations for those institutions receiving NSF ADVANCE
grants is that there is an assessment of the success of these
grants in achieving NSF’s goal of warming the climate for STEM
women faculty. The only way to assess the degree to which
this goal is achieved is to design and implement pre- and
post-grant climate surveys that are distributed to both female
and male STEM faculty. These surveys are then analyzed for
sex effects tied to the degree to which responders agree with
such statements as: My department does not engage in sex
discrimination; my department is open to women; women
have influence in the department; I am able to maintain a
good balance between my personal and professional life; and
so on. Such surveys are difficult to design well and analyze
meaningfully especially when they involve multiple institutions.
As a result, these surveys need the expertise of those trained in
psychology. Ideally, we will find ways to conduct similar surveys
in the APA. Unfortunately, however, NSF doesn’t provide funding
for philosophy-related projects. I think an important next step for
both the Women in Philosophy Task Force and the relevant APA
committees is to identify expertise and funding for collecting
meaningful demographic data and conducting climate surveys.
Once this is done, we can begin to target the chilliest aspects of
the climate for women in philosophy and apply best practices
towards warming these aspects. As the current Chair for the
APA’s Committee for the Status of Women and as a member
of the Women in Philosophy Task Force, I will do what I can
to promote and collaborate on important data collection and
climate assessments. Who knows? Perhaps someday in the
not-too-distant future, women in philosophy will finally reach
a critical mass; all philosophers will live in balmy warmth; and
no APA meetings will involve blizzards.
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A Call for Climate Change
Linda Martín Alcoff

Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center
The story in a nutshell about the climate for women in
philosophy is this: Although there are more of us than ever,
the climate is still bad. We need to take serious steps toward
climate change, but the philosophy profession as a whole is as
full of denial about this situation as Fox News is full of denials
about global warming.
Recently I was sitting in a coffee shop near NYU, reading
the blog “What Is It Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy?” and
finding myself, with some embarrassment, tearing up.1 The
blog is over-full with stories of disrespect, harassment, sexual
objectification, even an attempted rape at an APA conference.
Where else but in the U.S. military are women the targets of
such regular abuse by their own close colleagues? I have been
in departments where new female graduate students are looked
over as the new meat in town. At the department holiday party
I attended just a few months ago, one of my female students
said afterward, “That was a good party! No one groped me in
the corner this year.” Turns out that happened six years ago and
she has not been back to a department party since that time.
I have also known about consensual relationships that
developed between male faculty and female students that
seemed to be benign, but there continues to be an adverse
effect on the general credibility of women students (even
women faculty) when such relationships are even suspected:
it raises the specter of favoritism and unfair advantages, a
specter that can tar anyone’s career. Even more disturbing
is that, in the consensual relationships I have seen between
male faculty and female graduate students, the women
almost always drop out of the field. Causality is, of course,
difficult to trace with any certainty, yet one begins to wonder.
Perhaps the psychic shift from apprentice to lover creates a
category transference that changes one’s self-understanding. I
remember vividly a brilliant young female philosophy student
who was very shaken up by a come-on from her (much older)
main professor, asking me, “Was that what all his compliments
about my exams and papers were really about?” She later
“chose” not to pursue philosophy.
But the principal issue that comes out in sharp relief from
the blog “What Is It Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy?” is not
about harassment or come-ons but the thousand daily cuts that
collectively dissuade women from staying in: the aggressive and
peremptory dismissals in seminar, the a priori rejections and
derision of feminist philosophy, the ignoring, the assumptions
that affirmative action is the only reason someone has been
accepted, the nasty notes put in mailboxes and under one’s
door, such as the note that just said “whore “ in large letters.
Some men have been writing into this blog with surprise,
real concern, indignation. I take their concern to be legitimate,
and don’t think we should scoff too much at their surprise and
naiveté. They live and work in a parallel universe, a profession
without sexual overtones to be negotiated and managed, and
most have never heard women talk in an honest way about the
situation they experience.

In my experience, women in our profession are, as a group,
afraid to complain, loathe to complain, absolutely committed
to not complaining. When I began editing the collection that
became Singing in the Fire: Tales of Women in Philosophy more
than ten years ago, I found that senior women, even women with
tenure who had great jobs and enormous prestige, were quite
fearful of looking like self-indulgent whiners or political activists
rather than philosophers.2 Several declined my invitation to
write for the book with letters outlining these concerns. They
were afraid they’d lose male friends and support just by the act
of truthfully describing their experiences of making it into the
profession. And, of course, they were right to be afraid. We get
reputations for being certain sorts of philosophers, for operating
in certain sorts of ways professionally. And successful women
who are attractive are whispered about, as using their sexuality
for advancement. When even tenured and powerful women
keep silent about this situation, it keeps well-meaning men in
the dark, lets perpetrators get away with murder, and maintains
the climate of victim-blaming.
Reading the blog (and Singing in the Fire) will also
convey that there has been some significant change over the
last 20-25 years. Many more women (at least white women)
are in the field, without a doubt. Some female faculty are
portrayed in the blog as hostile to women students, as even
harassers themselves. I don’t doubt these stories, but I’d want
to underscore that the overall situation in philosophy is hardly
one in which male graduate students are preyed upon sexually
or experience objectifying remarks on a regular basis, as well
as hostility in seminars and barely concealed disbelief that they
might be equally smart. Some men may indeed get belittled,
but (white) men as a group are not viewed with skepticism
about their abilities or their right to be in the profession given
their gender identity.
Anecdotal reports need to be interpreted in light of an
understanding of the overall situation. Statistics can help.

Some Recent Statistics:
In 2008 the percentage of PhD’s earned by women in the U.S.
in all fields was a respectable 46%.3
But, of course, this is not distributed evenly across the
disciplines. Two-thirds of Ph.D.’s in Education were female;
58% of PhD’s in the social sciences were female. Only 28% of
PhD’s in the physical sciences went to women, and only 22%
of those in engineering. This is still a big increase from 1978, 30
years earlier, when only 10% of PhD’s in the physical sciences
went to women and 2% in engineering.
In terms of racial and ethnic identities, 23% of PhD’s in
2008 were earned by minorities who reported their identities.
Asians earned the most, 2,543, with African Americans earning
2,030, Latinos 1,765, and American Indians 123. Interestingly,
there is a noticeable concentration of minority doctorate
recipients in a small number of institutions, a noticeably greater
institutional concentration than for the doctorates as a whole.
This is an important phenomenon that requires analysis. I would
suggest it largely accords with the situation in philosophy.4
In regard to philosophy, as we know, the numbers of
women are much more comparable to the physical sciences
than to the humanities, a fact that no doubt pleases those among
us with closet or otherwise unexamined scientistic tendencies.
The numbers are striking: 21% of employed philosophers are
women, compared to 41% in the humanities as a whole.
Also striking is the following. About 27% of PhD’s in
philosophy have been going to women on average over the
last 15-20 years (there may be a bump in a year here and there,
but the average remains about this). In the mid-1980s the
percentage was 24%. This indicates that we have been stuck
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